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Abstract: Lehar (rightly) insists on the volumetric character of our experience of space. He claims
that three-dimensional space stems from the functional three-dimensional topology of the brain. But
his “Gestalt Bubble” model of volumetric space bears an intrinsically static structure—a kind of
theater, or “diorama,” bound to the visual modality. We call attention to the ambivalence of Gestalt
legacy and question the status and precise import of Lehar’s model and the phenomenology that
motivates it.
Lehar should be applauded for making a strong case for the fundamental character of volume and
depth in our experience of space. The originality of his proposal resides  inter alia in the radical
claim  that  three-dimensional  experience  of  space  stems  from  the  functional  three-dimensional
topology sustained by the human brain (not to be naïvely equated with brain topography). He posits
that subjective spatial experience criterially requires a three-dimensional topological substratum—a
device  lacking  three-dimensional  topological-dynamical  structure  could  never  account  for
volumetric experience of space. In other words, the only viable option for a functionalist indifferent
to brain physiology is three-dimensional topological-dynamical functionalism.
Lehar depicts his model as an outgrowth of Gestalt tradition. Indeed, one can easily recognize two
essential features of Gestalt theory: its phenomenological approach to subjective experience, and the
postulate of psychophysical isomorphism. Phenomenological space, its emergence, and its scientific
explanation  as  a  brain  process  are,  according  to  Lehar,  grounded  in  pregiven,  continuous,  and
coherent topology, specifically a three-dimensional functional topology.
Lehar  may not  be  aware  that  the  way Gestalt  psychologists  treated  space  was  in  reality  quite
equivocal. Although they were in principle cognizant of the fundamental status of volumetric space,
they granted it low priority in their scientific agenda and tended “provisionally” to treat space as a
series of transparent/opaque surfaces, if not as ambient ground against which to set a figure. On the
other hand, it is true that Köhler’s theory of psychophysical isomorphism explicitly referred to three-
dimensional  functional  brain topology to  construe not  only three-dimensional  geometrical  static
structures  but  also  two-dimensional  structures  evolving  in  time  (see  Koffka  1935).  The  theory
combined  empirical  and  phenomenological  constraints  with  speculative  brain  physics  (e.g.,  the
theory of cortical fields) so as to represent both brain process and phenomenological experience in a
single dynamical scheme (see Rosenthal & Visetti 2003).
Several  attempts  have been made to model  Gestalt  principles of perception in  accordance with
neurophysiology  and  in  particular  with  the  doctrine  of  neural  coding (e.g.,  of  perceptual
1
microfeatures).  For  example,  models  of  neural  fields or  neural  repertoires feature  a  two-
dimensional functional topology that corresponds to a topographic two-dimensional arrangement of
units in primary areas (e.g., retinotopy) (e.g., Hoffman 1989; Koenderinck 1990; see Petitot 1999 for
a review). Less discrete models, unconstrained by brain physiology, developed in the context of
image processing and sometimes resorted to fairly complex mathematics but maintained set to a
bidimensionality of their input (retinal or pictorial; see Morel & Solimini 1995). The very idea of
three-dimensional functional topology was hardly taken into consideration in the few attempts to
account for depth (e.g., Grossberg 1994), which hence had to resort to hosts of specialized coding
units: a patently implausible solution, as Lehar rightly noted.
The solution advocated by Lehar is original and certainly deserves attention. He defines a three-
dimensional topological milieu where any local element can be in one of four states (corresponding
to local surface elements). Each individual element (or point in a perceptual matrix) exerts a field
influence on adjacent elements for them to take on a similar state (or to be prevented from this by
inhibition). Reciprocal determination between surface elements is assumed to generate equilibrium
in which the relevant features are stabilized. The input to the model is an image set in the frontal
plane (much like a retinal image). The output (actually the first step in “geometrization” of space) is
a distribution of geometrical surface microfeatures in a three-dimensional space. Although Lehar
does not mention this issue, one can readily deduce that unit formation or individuation is assumed
to take place in this  three-dimensional  visual matrix.  The originality of this  proposal should be
highlighted: Whereas the majority of rival models first individuate two-dimensional units  (from
two-dimensional image input), then categorize them as faces of three-dimensional units, Lehar sets
his  three-dimensional  structure  ab  initio, and  whatever  is  to  populate  this  three-dimensional
distribution of geometrical microfeatures supposedly comes next.
It is not clear, however, which scientific question Lehar has set out to answer. He does not seem to
attempt  another  perspectival reconstruction of  the visual  field,  for  his  model,  in  contrast  to  its
alleged purely phenomenological  motivation,  builds  on  a  physicalist  metaphor.  Although Lehar
dismisses neurophysiological concerns, the analogy between his model and neural net models jumps
to the eye: Traditional “neurons” with their receptor fields are replaced by elements or points in
perceptual matrix, and neural connections are supplanted by fields of influence. Moreover, Lehar
alludes to the possibility that the model may take a discrete or granular form (see Lehar, Fig. 7A).
Why, then, does he hammer so loudly his physicalist credo? It seems that Lehar believes that the
process by which space is  constituted necessarily sheds light on the way we perceive space. Then
why does he not try to motivate his model genetically? Clearly, Lehar needs to tell us the rules of
the scientific game he plays more explicitly (does he want to model the constitution of space from a
purely  phenomenological  viewpoint  or  does  he  attempt  a  free  mathematical  reconstruction  of
subjective experience?).
Lehar could have mentioned that during the past century other theorists put forth elaborate proposals
concerning the constitution of space experience (e.g., Gibson 1950; Husserl 1907/1997; Poincaré
1905/2001). Instead of sticking to neurophysiology, they referred to the structure of the organism or
the  lived  body. These  were  strongly  dynamic,  sensorimotor  “models”  of  constitution  of
phenomenological  space  that  assumed  a  multimodal  origin  of  volumetric  space  and  explicitly
related  its  dimensionality  to  repertoires  of  self-generated  movements.  Although  none  of  these
“models” can be regarded as fully effective, they account for the ontogenesis of space in a dynamic
fashion and for a variety of phenomena of adaptation (e.g., to distorting or inverting goggles). We
suggest that considering the dynamics of genetic, multimodal,  and sensorimotor character of the
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constitution of space is as important in modeling perceived space as neurophysiology and the kind
of  static  geometry  on  which  Lehar  elaborates.  What  comes  along  with  such  dynamics  is  the
constitutive  relationship  between  external and  bodily space. Lehar  appears  to  be  aware  that
perception of space involves one’s own body, but instead of taking this as a constitutive relation, he
treats the body as just another object in space.
Finally, we have strong reservations with respect to Lehar’s phenomenology. The field of vision he
refers  to  neglects  readiness  for  prospective  action,  and  the  phenomenological  subject  is  not
immersed  in  the  practical  field of  ongoing  activity  with  its  qualitative,  praxeological,  and
prospective dimensions (see Rosenthal & Visetti 2003). What about the nonisotropy of perceived
space and the resulting potential heterogeneity in the constitution of regions of space? Is it advisable
to consider phenomenological space as a mere deployment (be it three-dimensional) independent of
the engaged or prospective actions to which it gives stage?
Gibson, J. J. (1950) The perception of the visual world. Houghton Mifflin.   [VR]
Grossberg, S. (1994) 3-D vision and figure-ground separation by visual cortex. Perception and
Psychophysics 55: 48-120.  [VR]
Hoffman, W. C. (1989) The visual cortex is a contact bundle. Applied Mathematics and
Computation 32:137–67.   [VR]
Husserl, E. (1907/1997) Thing and space: Lectures of 1907. Kluwer Academic.   [VR]
Koenderinck, J. J. (1990) The brain as a geometry engine. Psychological Research 52:122–27.
[VR]
Koffka, K. (1935)  Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Harcourt Brace.  [VR]
Morel, J. M. & Solimini, S. (1995) Variational methods in image segmentation. Birckhaüser.   [VR]
Petitot, J. (1999) Morphological eidetics. In: Naturalizing phenomenology. Issues in contemporary
phenomenology and cognitive science, ed. J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J. M. Roy.
Stanford University Press.   [VR]
Poincaré, H. (1905/2001) The value of science: essential writings of Henri Poincaré. Modern
Library.[VR]
Rosenthal, V. & Visetti, Y. M. (2003) Köhler. Les Belles Lettres.   [VR]
3
